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ABSTRACT 
Electronic monitoring in the workplace has been the subject of 
relentless public criticism.  Privacy advocates argue that 
technological advancements have given overbearing employers 
powerful tools to abuse employee dignity in the name of 
productivity and that new legislation should bolster workplace 
privacy rights.  This iBrief contends that current U.S. legal doctrine 
governing electronic monitoring in the workplace is fair given the 
nature and purpose of the workplace, and potential employer 
liability for employee misconduct.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Technology continues to make the world a smaller place; it is easier 
to keep in touch with people than ever before.  This is not an entirely 
positive development, however.  The ease with which individuals’ personal 
information may be recorded, documented, identified and produced is a 
controversial issue.  For example, significant debate has centered on the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Carnivore Project which has the capacity 
to monitor millions of electronic communications worldwide.2  Even the use 
of traffic cameras to monitor public intersections, where no one has an 
expectation of seclusion, is to some an invasion of privacy.3 
¶2 This debate is especially intense in the context of electronic 
monitoring in the workplace.4  Should employees have a right to Internet 
                                                     
1 J.D, LL.M., Duke University School of Law, May 2004; B.A., University of 
Virginia, May 2001. The author is currently practicing law in New York City. 
2 See, e.g., Erich Luening, FBI Takes the Teeth Out of Carnivore’s Name, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Feb. 9, 2001 at 
http://news.com.com/FBI+takes+the+teeth+out+of+Carnivores+name/2100-
1023_3-252368.html (explaining that Carnivore has engendered so much public 
controversy that the FBI has now changed the program’s name to DCS1000) 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004). 
3 See, e.g., John Martin, Caught Red Handed, ABCNEWS.COM, May 23, 2003, at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/WorldNewsTonight/wnt010523_running_re
dlights.html  (last visited Sept. 22, 2004) 
4 Hereinafter, the term “Internet” also includes email transmissions that occur 
over local office “intranet” networks.  While it is possible that fine distinctions 
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access free from employer supervision?  In the United States, the law has 
not recognized a strong right to privacy for employee Internet use.  This 
reality has driven many to argue for a reallocation of legal rights.  Some 
assert that employees’ privacy rights in the work place should be bolstered 
with additional statutory protections to preserve employees’ sense of 
dignity.5  Others seek the development of an entirely new privacy regime.6   
¶3 This iBrief argues that changing the law governing workplace 
privacy is unnecessary.  The current law in this area is sufficiently dynamic 
to incorporate technological advances and represents an equitable 
distribution of the legal rights and obligations of all parties concerned.  
Although employees have little legal protection while perusing the Internet 
or communicating by email at work, this minimal degree of protection is 
commensurate with the nature and purpose of the workplace and the 
substantial liability employers face for employee misuse of the Internet.  
Moreover, employers are unlikely to abuse their monitoring privilege, as it 
is in their best interest to balance surveillance needs with employee quality 
                                                                                                                       
may be drawn between the “Internet” and an “intranet” under federal and state 
wiretap statutes, the author is of the belief those distinctions will not 
significantly affect judicial outcomes. 
5 See, e.g., Peter J. Isajiw, Comment, Workplace E-mail Privacy Concerns: 
Balancing the Personal Dignity of Employees with the Proprietary Interests of 
Employers, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH J. 73, 74 (2001) (“[S]tatutory 
intervention seems the only means to protect individual human dignity and 
privacy in e-mail accessed at work.”); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the 
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. 
REV. 825, 848 n.89 (1998) (summarizing various law review articles that argue 
for changes ranging from an amendment to the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 to new workplace privacy legislation).  The issue is 
certainly one that is international in scope.  See, e.g., Robert Muckle, Email 
Monitoring in the Workplace: A Simple Guide to Employers (July 2003), at 
http://www.pythagoras.co.uk/file_attachments/mai/Email_in_the_Workplace.pd
f (last visited Sept. 22, 2004), (discussing The Employment Practices Data 
Protection Code released in June 2003 in the United Kingdom); Privacy 
Amendment (Private Sector) Act of 2000, No. ___ 2000, available at 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/Repository/Legis/oldBills/Linked/2301011
2.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2004) (Australian Act expanding the 1988 Privacy 
Act to govern the manner of collecting, recording, and transferring employees 
personal information revealed in electronic surveillance). 
6 See, e.g., Wilborn, supra note 5, at 830-31 (advocating the elimination of the 
“anachronistic inequality” created by maintaining a distinction in individual 
privacy protection afforded employees in public and private sector workplaces); 
Donald R. McCartney, Comment, Electronic Surveillance and the Resulting 
Loss of Privacy in the Workplace, 62 UMKC L. REV. 859, 891 (1994) 
(“[L]egislation needs to be enacted that provides a generalized protection for the 
right to privacy.”). 
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of life and because employer misuse of personal information is prohibited 
by a variety of existing legal doctrines. 
I.  EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO INTERNET PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE 
¶4 As currently applied, federal law affords employees little protection 
from electronic monitoring.  Internet monitoring, including local network 
email monitoring, has been attacked by employees primarily on two 
theories: first, as an unlawful interception of a wire communication or 
unauthorized wiretap; and second, as an invasion of privacy.7   
¶5 Challenges to electronic monitoring by employers based on 
unauthorized wiretaps typically fail because the state or federal wiretap 
statute is inapplicable to email monitoring, or because the particular manner 
by which employers monitor the communication is outside the scope of the 
statute.8  The statute most frequently at issue has been the 1986 Federal 
Electronic Privacy Communications Act (“EPCA”).  The EPCA does not 
prohibit interceptions of electronic communications made in the ordinary 
course of business for the purpose of protecting the rights or property of the 
network provider, as well as interceptions made with the consent of the 
sender or recipient.9  Thus, those companies that monitor their networks to 
                                                     
7 Invasion of privacy is sometimes more narrowly presented as a cause of action 
for “intrusion upon seclusion.”  Invasion of privacy is often considered to 
include other causes of action such as public disclosure of private facts.  
8 See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co, 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (finding that no interception had occurred under the EPCA where the 
email was reviewed by the company in its post-transmission storage bank after 
transmission to the intended recipient was complete); Wesley College v. Pitts, 
974 F. Supp. 375, 384 (D. Del. 1997) (finding that the EPCA requires an email 
to be intercepted while in transit and does not include reading an email off of a 
computer screen); Restuccia v. Burk Technology, Inc., 1996 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 367, *4—*6 (Mass. Super. 1996) (finding that a Massachusetts wire tap 
statute clearly permitted the retention of emails in a back up system because the 
system met the exception for an intercommunication device used in the ordinary 
course of business); C. Forbes Sargent, III, Electronic Media and the 
Workplace: Confidentiality, Privacy, and Other Issues, 41 BOSTON B.J. 6, 19 
(1997) (citing Flanagan v. Epson America, an unpublished opinion of the 
California Court of Appeals that held the California wire tap law covered 
telephone conversations, not email). 
9 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2710 (2000). The EPCA is notably ambiguous.  See 
Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 633, though it is clear “network providers” has been 
deemed to include employers.  See U.S. v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (finding an airline to be a service provider of its reservation network 
and therefore exempted from the ECPA for actions taken in the ordinary course 
of business to protect the airlines rights or property).  The meaning of “ordinary 
course of business” has been more elusive, however.  See Adams v. City of 
Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2001) (“‘Ordinary course of business’ 
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protect their interests, or do so with employee consent, have a strong 
argument that they are exempt from federal wire tap regulation.  
¶6 Invasion of privacy is a more potent ground on which employees 
object to Internet monitoring.  A right of privacy generally extends to 
employees in the workplace.  This right is, however, typically limited to 
those instances where the matter intruded upon is “intensely private.”10  
Thus, where an employer videotapes an employee’s medical examination in 
her office11 or reads personal medical documents on an employee’s desk,12 a 
jury may be permitted to hear the issue.  However, the nature of the 
workplace is generally a public one and an employee is hired for the 
purpose of attending to company business, not personal matters.  Therefore, 
courts tend to reject most employees’ privacy claims on the basis that there 
was no reasonable expectation of privacy.13 
¶7 The public nature of the workplace has led many courts to find that 
no right of Internet privacy exists at work.  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts declares: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, 
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”14  In applying this 
standard, courts have most commonly found monitoring of employee 
Internet use not to be an invasion of privacy for two reasons: first, 
employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy for communications 
voluntarily transmitted on an employer’s network; and second, even if there 
were a reasonable expectation of privacy, the intrusion upon seclusion is not 
highly offensive.  The courts have reached similar conclusions even when 
no notice of employer monitoring was provided to the employee. 
                                                                                                                       
is not defined in the statute, but it generally requires that the use be (1) for a 
legitimate business purpose, (2) routine and (3) with notice.  There is some 
disagreement in the case law about whether ‘covert’ monitoring can ever be in 
the ‘ordinary course of business.’”).  For a more extensive review of the law in 
this area see Isajiw, supra note 5, at 81-89.   
10 See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and 
Its Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace 
Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L. J. 301, 313 (2003) (“[B]ecause courts have 
recognized a diminished expectation of privacy in the workplace, claims for this 
tort typically lie only where the matter intruded upon is intensely private.”). 
11 See Acuff v. IPB, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 1999). 
12 See Doe v. Kohn Nast, & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
13 See Gabel and Mansfield, supra note 10 and accompanying text; Isajiw, supra 
note 5, at 74 (“[Y]ears of precedent, including recent decisions, have construed 
this right too narrowly in the context of employer/employee relationships.”).   
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976). 
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¶8 In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,15 a federal district court conclusively 
rejected the argument that email monitoring by the employer constitutes an 
invasion of privacy.16  In the case, the employee plaintiff had been assured 
that the content of monitored emails would remain confidential and would 
not be used against employees for termination or reprimand, although the 
employee was advised that the email privilege should not be abused.17  
After the employer reviewed multiple emails that contained offensive 
commentary about the employer, the employee was terminated for abusing 
the email privilege by sending too many emails.18  Granting summary 
judgment, the court held, “[O]nce plaintiff communicated the alleged 
unprofessional comments to a second person (his supervisor) over an e-mail 
system which was apparently utilized by the entire company, any 
reasonable expectation of privacy was lost.”19  The court also found that the 
interception of emails was not highly offensive.20  
¶9 Supporting these conclusions, the court emphasized the voluntary 
nature of the communication and the company’s interest in providing a safe 
work environment.21  Because the emails were sent voluntarily, the facts at 
hand could be distinguished from those cases where employees were 
required to disclose personal information.  Greater scrutiny would be 
warranted, for instance, when as a condition to continued employment an 
employee submits to a urinalysis test or search of their personal property.22  
In recognizing an employer’s substantial liability for employee Internet use, 
the court further asserted, “[T]he company's interest in preventing 
inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its 
e-mail system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may have in 
those comments.”23  
¶10 The precedent established by Smyth does not mean that monitoring 
an employee’s Internet use may never be considered an invasion of 
privacy.24  For example, in another 1996 case, Restuccia v. Burk 
                                                     
15 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
16 Id. at 101. 
17 Id. at 98. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 101. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. (emphasis added). 
24 See Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. 01-3386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2408, 
at **24—25 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (“Smyth . . . do[es] not necessarily 
foreclose the possibility that an employee might have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in certain e-mail communications, depending upon the circumstances 
of the communication and the configuration of the e-mail system.”). 
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Technology, Inc.,25 a Massachusetts superior court found that where two 
employees were not informed that their email could be accessed by others 
and their computer accounts were protected by individual passwords, a 
claim of invasion of privacy would survive summary judgment.26  Other 
cases generally support the holding in Smyth.  Even in those instances 
where no notice was provided to the employee that monitoring would 
occur27  or when the employee was convinced that the employer provided 
him space to shelter emails from management’s purview, there is not 
necessarily a reasonable expectation of privacy.28  Where the employee has 
constructive notice that his or her emails are subject to management’s 
review, courts have unanimously found monitoring not to be an invasion of 
privacy.29 
¶11 Therefore, an invasion of privacy claim against an employer for 
monitoring employee Internet use is unlikely, and is almost certainly 
proscribed if the employer has given the employee notice.30  This allocation 
of legal rights, which appears to favor the employer, has been attacked from 
                                                     
25 1996 Mass. Super LEXIS 367. 
26 Id. at **2—3, 9. The continued relevance of the Restuccia decision is 
questionable, however.  The opinion quickly disposed of the issue without 
inquiring into precedent, and a more recent case in the Federal District Court for 
Massachusetts contradicts the holding. See Garrity v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *6 (D. Mass. May 7, 
2002). 
27 See Id.; Kelleher, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2408 at **25—26; McClaren v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex App. LEXIS 4103, at *13 
(Tex. Ct. App. May 28, 1999).   
28 See McClaren, 1999 Tex App. LEXIS 4103 at **4—13.   
29 See Garrity, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at **2—5 (finding that Plaintiff 
forwarded jokes clearly with the expectation that they would be shared); 
Kelleher, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2408, at *25 (finding that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy could exist where the City Guidelines specifically 
informed employee that no expectation of privacy should exist.).  
30 Collateral actions predicated upon an invasion of privacy, such as wrongful 
discharge, fail on the same grounds. See Garrity, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 at 
*9 (finding a wrongful discharge claim predicated upon employer monitoring of 
email duplicative of privacy and wire tap claims and misplaced); Smyth v. 
Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100—01 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that because 
the employer did not tortuously invade the employee’s privacy, it could not have 
been have violated public policy by dismissing him on account of the 
information revealed by employer’s monitoring). Cf Restuccia, 1996 Mass. 
Super. LEXIS 367 at **9—10 (rejecting Defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination where the claim was 
based on plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy that had been permitted to 
proceed to trial). 
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all sides by commentators concerned about privacy and dignity.  The 
current legal doctrine is, however, entirely fair and reasonable. 
II.  MONITORING EMPLOYEE USE OF THE INTERNET IS REASONABLE 
¶12  The minimal privacy protection afforded employees is fair and 
reasonable given the nature and purpose of the workplace, and the 
substantial liability employers face for employee Internet use. 
¶13 The workplace is generally not a private place.  In the seclusion of 
one’s home there is a well-established and legally protected expectation of 
privacy from other persons.31  However, upon leaving one’s private 
residence and entering premises possessed by another, expectations of 
privacy are drastically reduced because one occupies property over which 
one does not exercise complete dominion.32  An expectation of privacy can 
be otherwise established by contract or substantiated where the premises are 
intensely private such as a locker room, hotel bedroom, or office restroom.33 
Nevertheless, such cases are the exception rather than the norm.  An 
employer’s facilities are predominantly public in nature because they are 
not directly owned by the employee and they are shared with others.   
¶14 The lack of privacy in the workplace is particularly justifiable 
because occupation by an employee of the premises is conditioned on using 
those premises to achieve employer goals.  Employees are provided certain 
tools by the employer—for instance, a phone, voicemail, email and Internet 
access—principally because those items help the employee achieve a 
business objective.  It is here, however, that many supporters of increased 
employee privacy rights make their stand.  They contend that the increased 
productivity demands of the workplace require employees to mingle the 
personal and the professional, especially when it comes to such items as 
phone, email or Internet usage, and that the law in this area should 
                                                     
31 See Isajiw, supra note 5, at 93 (commenting that notions of privacy in the 
United States are intricately tied to conceptions of personal property thus “the 
sphere of control that is privacy is commonly associated with a person’s home 
or marital relationship”).  See also Wilborn, supra note 5 (arguing that the 
public/private distinction granting government employees greater privacy rights 
is a false distinction and should be amended).  
32 This connection between proprietary interests and privacy is well-established 
in the U.S. legal tradition.  Id. 
33 See, e.g., Doe by Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1427 
(8th Cir. 1991) (affirming verdict for Plaintiff where the changing room for 
fashion show models was monitored by video surveillance).  Some states 
specifically forbid monitoring of certain areas.  See, e.g., Adams v. Oak Park 
Marina, 261 A.D.2d 903, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding that New York’s 
General Business Law §395-b prohibits the installation of a video camera in a 
bathroom). 
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recognize such a real workplace dynamic.34  Employees are going to take 
care of personal business in the office because it is necessitated by 
circumstance and if the employee can most quickly resolve the personal 
matter by using workplace resources it also inures to the employer’s 
benefit.35  In such an environment, where employees’ handling of intensely 
private matters results in a benefit to the employer in terms of increased 
morale and productivity, employees arguably should not be forced to 
sacrifice their privacy rights. 
¶15 This argument is valid so long as employees do not abuse the 
privilege.  Unfortunately, the privilege is commonly abused.  One recent 
study found that employees use the Internet 75.5% of the time for their 
work and 24.5% of time for personal reasons such as reading the news, 
viewing pornography, day trading and keeping up on sports scores.36 
Shirking did not begin with the creation of the Internet, of course.  Before 
the Internet, employees wasted time by the water cooler or in the smoke 
room.  The difference is that those environments were easily monitored 
without the aid of surveillance software.  There is some sense of seclusion 
in one’s use of the Internet because it usually takes place at an individual 
terminal.  However, if an employer is entitled to measure the effort 
employees put into their work, then monitoring Internet usage should be 
reasonably expected by all employees and even welcomed by some.37 
¶16 Employee misuse of the Internet can also result in substantial legal 
liability for the employer.38  Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an 
employer may be held liable for the actions of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment or in furtherance of the employer’s 
                                                     
34 See Isajiw, supra note 5, at 94. 
35 Id. 
36 Regina Lynn Preciado, Mouses to the Grindstone, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 12, 
1998, at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,14371,00.html (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2004). 
37 Individuals whose work cannot be adequately measured by output, but 
requires some recognition of effort, should in many instances favor monitoring.   
38 This reality has been noted by a number of courts to support their dismissal of 
invasion of privacy claims for Internet surveillance.  See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 
914 F. Supp. 97, 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[T]he company's interest in preventing 
inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its e-
mail system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may have in those 
comments.”); McClaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex 
App. LEXIS 4103, at *13 (Tex. Ct. App. May 28, 1999) (“[T]he company's 
interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments, or even 
illegal activity, over its e-mail system would outweigh [the plaintiff’s] claimed 
privacy interest in those communications.”). 
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interest.39  While “scope of employment” could be interpreted narrowly, 
vicarious liability of an employer for the actions of her employees has been 
and continues to be interpreted broadly.40  So long as an employee’s 
wrongful act is closely connected to a work activity, the scope of 
employment condition is likely met.41  Even if the employee engages in an 
activity specifically forbidden by the employer, so long as he was carrying 
out job responsibilities, the employer will probably be liable.42  Thus, an 
employer will likely be liable in those instances where an employee 
commits a foreseeably wrongful act during regular business hours in an 
office provided by the employer.43  This broad interpretation is even more 
daunting to an employer-defendant because the employer bears the burden 
                                                     
39 N. PETER LAREAU, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 270.01[1] (2004).  The 
Restatement (Second) of Agency states that: 
 
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only 
if: 
a) It is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
b) It occurs substantially within the authorized time and space 
limits; 
c) It is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
master; and 
d) If force is intentionally used by the servant against another, 
the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. 
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is 
different in kind from that authorized, far beyond time or space 
limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.  
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). 
40 LAREAU, supra note 39, at § 270.01[1]. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Va. 1995) 
(finding that a hospital employer liable for sexual assault of a patient by a doctor 
because the act occurred during regular hours, in an office provided by the 
hospital, and patient abuse was foreseeable). Other courts have gone even 
further in drawing employees’ actions into the scope of employment.  For 
instance, in Goff v. Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 713 N.E.2d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1999), an Illinois appellate court ruled that an act occurred in the scope of 
employment if “its origin is in some way connected with the employment so that 
there is a causal connection between the employment and the . . . injury.”  Id. at 
582.  Similarly, in Davis v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Vt. 
1998), a Vermont federal district court determined that conduct falls within the 
scope of employment “when it occurs within a period of time when the 
employee is on duty and in a place where the employee may reasonably be 
expected to be while fulfilling the duties of his or her employment contract.” Id. 
at 197. 
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of showing that an act was outside the scope of employment.44  Therefore, 
employee claims will often survive summary judgment and exponentially 
increase the cost and risk of litigation to the employer.  Some courts have 
been more willing to declare that an employee was off on a “frolic of his 
own” as opposed to acting in the scope of employment; however, for 
employers seeking to operate safely within the confines of the law, judicial 
uncertainty favors conservatism and justifies supervision. 
¶17 The potential for employer liability to third persons arising out of 
unlawful employee conduct on the Internet is significant.  The Internet is a 
powerful instrument with which employees can commit numerous 
illegitimate or unlawful acts.  Not only can employees communicate with 
each other beyond the view of managers, they can also communicate with 
the entire World Wide Web without management’s notice.  Defamation, 
public disclosure of private facts, false light, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress are all causes of action easily satisfied by an employee’s 
publication of information to the web.  Trade secrets and patents belonging 
to a client also are easily ruined by Internet transmission.  These causes of 
action are in addition to spamming, computer fraud and other computer-
oriented abuses.  Many of these Internet offenses will likely be based upon 
facts that bring the conduct within the scope of employment.  They can be 
committed during regular work day hours by an employee using the Internet 
under the auspices of performing work-related tasks, on a network and 
computer provided by the employer, and it is entirely foreseeable that that 
these privileges are subject to employee abuse in many different ways.  
¶18 Moreover, employers are liable in some cases even for those acts 
committed by its employees outside the scope of employment.  Generally, 
an employer has a duty to ensure a safe working environment and the safety 
of those who will foreseeably come into contact with its employees.45  The 
doctrine of negligent retention may result in employer liability if an 
employer knew or should have known that an employee was unfit to carry 
out his duties.46  An employer is also liable for an employee’s conduct if 
that employee used his actual or apparent authority to commit a wrongful 
act.47  Most significantly, violations by employees of anti-discrimination 
statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,48 the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,49 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act50 can 
                                                     
44 See Doe, 912 F. Supp. at 194. 
45 LAREAU, supra note 39, § 270.03[4]. 
46 Id. § 270.03[3][c]. 
47 Id. § 270.03[5][a]. 
48 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
49 Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (1992) 
50 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81. Stat. 602 (1967). 
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result in substantial liability for an employer.51  Title VII involves the 
greatest potential liability for most employers.  While the Supreme Court 
has found sexual harassment to fall outside the scope of employment, if an 
act is committed by a supervisor52 and involves a “tangible employment 
action” against the complaining employee such as termination, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a significant 
change in benefits, a violation will be deemed to have occurred.53  Absent 
an employer’s ability to establish that it took reasonable care to prevent or 
correct the wrong and that the employee failed to avail herself of the 
employer’s remedial measures, the employer will be held liable for the 
supervisor’s actions and possibly subjected to punitive damages.54 
¶19 Therefore, to the extent that an employee’s use of the Internet falls 
outside of the scope of employment, causes of action may arise for breach 
of an employer’s general duty of care, under the doctrines of negligent 
retention or actual or apparent authority, or under various statutory sections 
like Title VII.  Negligent retention, in particular, presents an interesting 
dilemma for employers.  An employer may be held liable for an employee’s 
acts if the employer “should have known” what the employee was doing.  
Therefore, if monitoring an employee’s Internet activity is a common and 
cost efficient method of supervision, the failure to implement such an 
electronic surveillance system could be used against the employer.55  For 
example, a Wall Street firm was recently fined for failing to monitor instant 
messages sent between traders.56  An employer’s general duty of care may 
                                                     
51 LAREAU, supra note 39, at§ 270.04[1].  The precedents set out for harassment 
claims under Title VII have been widely read into anti-discrimination statutes as 
well.  Id. 
52 Employers are held liable for acts committed by co-workers only if they knew 
or should have known about the conduct and failed to remedy the improper 
conduct.  Id. § 270.04[2]. 
53 Id. § 270.04[3]. 
54 Id. §§ 270.04[4]—.05. The landmark Supreme Court decision governing the 
assessment of punitive damages in Title VII claims is Kolstad v. Am. Dental 
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).  The Court held that “in the punitive damages 
context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory 
employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary 
to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’” Id. at 545 
(quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(Tatel, J., dissenting)). 
55 But see Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 551 (N.J. 2000) 
(holding in the context of a Title VII sexual harassment suit that employers do 
not have a duty to monitor employee’s mail). 
56 Nand Mulchandani, Workplace Monitoring: How to Protect Yourself, 
TECHTV.COM, at 
http://www.g4techtv.com/callforhelp/features/37738/Workplace_Monitoring_H
ow_to_Protect_Yourself.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2004). 
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also give rise to the same conflict.  Title VII claims of harassment and 
discrimination have already been an area flush with litigation over employer 
liability for employee emails.  Emails are often cited in the complaint and 
accepted as evidence of harassment and discrimination.57 
¶20 The potential for employer liability to third persons injured by its 
employee’s Internet use is not the limit of damage that can be caused by an 
employer’s failure to monitor electronic activity in the workplace.  Great 
damage can be caused to the employer’s own operations.  Given their actual 
or apparent authority, employees may have the ability to bind the 
corporation to unwanted contracts or be officially quoted by the press on an 
unapproved topic.  Similarly, trade secrets, patents and business models and 
plans may be distributed without management’s notice. 
¶21 Hence the workplace is more public than private, and most 
assuredly, it is a place for work.  The ease with which the Internet provides 
employees a mechanism for shirking their responsibilities and engaging in 
illicit activities warrants employer monitoring of electronic activity.  
Regulators have recognized that the substantial liability employers bear for 
their employees’ acts requires this supervision.  Even the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission specifically recommends that 
employers closely monitor employee conduct to mitigate their liability for 
harassment and discrimination.58  While some may view monitoring as an 
intrusion meant to assert even greater control over employees, for most 
employers Internet surveillance stems from their basic responsibility to 
ensure a safe workplace for their employees and the public at large.  Indeed, 
employers have a number of incentives to ensure that they do not abuse 
their right to monitor. 
                                                     
57 See, e.g., Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551—52 (holding that postings on an electronic 
bulletin board may be sufficient to establish employer liability for harassment); 
Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1186, 1188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(finding that supervisor’s behavior both in person and in email communications 
was sufficient for a jury to find gender discrimination); Petersen v. Minneapolis 
Cmty. Dev. Agency, 1994 WL 455699, *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994) 
(finding that harassing emails that continued even after unwelcome physical 
advances stopped were sufficient to support plaintiff’s claim of sexual 
harassment); Ann Carrns, Prying Times:  Those Bawdy E-mails Were Good for 
a Laugh-Until the Ax Fell, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, at A1 (noting that 
Chevron settled with four employees for $2,200,000 for harassment claims that 
included the circulation of chauvinistic jokes by employees). Cf. Schwenn v. 
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 1998 WL 166845, *4 (N.D.N.Y. April 7, 1998) (finding 
email messages sent to the plaintiff not sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
establish liability). 
58 LAREAU, supra note 39, at § 270.03[4] (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, 
“Vicarious Employer Responsibility for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors,” 
June 18, 1999). 
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III.  EMPLOYERS ARE UNLIKELY TO ABUSE THEIR RIGHT TO 
MONITOR 
¶22 While some commentators take a principled stand and reject all 
employer monitoring of employee Internet use, many would agree that if the 
sole motivation for monitoring employees’ Internet usage was to detect 
crimes and maintain a safe and respectable work environment, an 
employer’s right to monitor electronic activity would be less objectionable.  
Thus the right itself is not as objectionable as the potential for that right to 
be abused.  Many commentators fear that employers may use their ability to 
monitor to turn the workplace into an “electronic sweatshop” or use the 
information obtained through their surveillance to the detriment of the 
employee.59  These fears are reasonable given the fact that employers 
typically possess substantial bargaining power.  Anecdotal evidence of 
employee monitoring at its worst includes stories about an employees being 
fired for inappropriate comments about a supervisor in emails to co-
workers, chair devices that monitor worker “wiggling” in the belief that 
more wiggling means less work, and employer monitoring of bathroom use 
that includes publication of a schedule of total bathroom minutes per 
employee.60  However, employers actually have little incentive to abuse 
their monitoring privilege because it does not promote a productive work 
environment.  Moreover, if information gathered through electronic 
monitoring were improperly handled, the employer could very well be 
subject to substantial liability.  
¶23 As discussed in Part II, monitoring employee Internet use is one 
tool to prevent shirking.  Where extended water cooler stops and smoke 
breaks are easily identified and checked, it is far more difficult for the 
employer to determine whether an employee is actually being productive 
while using the Internet, especially if the difficulty of the task varies or an 
employee’s contribution is not able to be easily identified.  Thus, electronic 
monitoring software that records and consolidates information on how that 
employee is using her computer helps overcome this information 
asymmetry.  Of some objection is the fact that electronic monitoring is so 
comprehensive that every detail is recorded.  As one commentator asserts: 
“Worst of all, the supervisor isn’t even human.  Employees must labor at 
top speed under the view of unwinking computer taskmasters that record 
every item of work completed, along with every mistake, rest break and 
deviation from standard practice.”61  The fact that an Internet monitoring 
                                                     
59 See, e.g., Paul Atwell, Big Brother and the Sweatshop: Computer Surveillance 
in the Automated Office, 5 SOC. THEORY 87 (1987). 
60 See Wilborn, supra note 5, at 825. 
61 See FINKIN, ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 224 
(3rd ed. 2002) (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ELECTRONIC 
SUPERVISOR 25 (1987)).  
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system will record every detail, however, distorts the nature of the 
employer’s objective and the reality of the threat. 
¶24 Employers seek to maximize productivity, but they must do so with 
an understanding that they are dealing with employees who are limited by 
their own human nature.  Even the finest employee may be guilty of the 
occasional ESPN.com break and this deviation is perfectly acceptable so 
long as that employee is productive relative to his peers.62  An employer is 
aware that a Google search for a doctor is entirely that employee’s own 
business and that permitting employer resources to be used to that end will 
likely increase productivity by saving time.  With regards to those occasions 
where an employee speaks out against management to a third person, many 
times employers will respect co-worker communications so long as they do 
not disrupt the work environment.  In those cases where an employer does 
take action against the employee it is often justified, as employers should 
not be required to tolerate subversive commentary that achieves no 
constructive purpose. Furthermore, being caught chatting about 
inappropriate topics over email is almost indefensible if notice of 
monitoring has been provided. 
¶25 Along the same lines, an employer’s ability to monitor often must 
be balanced with considerations of employee morale and job satisfaction.  
For example, one University of Wisconsin study found that workers whose 
communications were monitored suffered from higher rates of depression, 
anxiety and fatigue than those not subject to monitoring at the same 
business.63  It is logical to assume that excessive monitoring aggravates 
these symptoms.  Ultimately, if an employer fails to determine the 
appropriate bounds of propriety, her business will suffer regardless of 
whether electronic privacy is granted employees or not.   
¶26 Examples such as the chair device that monitors wiggling and the 
public bathroom log also demonstrate that monitoring abuses, when they 
occur, are not limited to computer surveillance.  An employer may abuse 
her authority regardless of whether new technology is made available to her 
or not.  If the bargaining power of the employer is that substantial, it is a 
wonder how an electronic privacy statute will improve the workplace, given 
the fact that excessive monitoring can take so many different forms.  
Employers who are not permitted to monitor computer activity by using a 
software program may eliminate individual office space, or require 
employees to create individual logs and print out all correspondence.  As 
                                                     
62 See Atwell, supra note 59, at 96 (“Management needs only a ranking of its 
employees in terms of productivity for purposes of promotion, sanctions, or 
firings”). 
63 See Peter Blackman & Barbara Franklin, Blocking Big Brother;  Proposed 
Law Limits Employers' Right to Snoop, N.Y. L. J., (Aug. 19, 1993), at 5. 
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noted in one journal of sociology: “Management has long had the tools 
necessary to tell who was, in its opinion, a good worker and who a bad 
worker, via observation, auditing and related forms of surveillance of 
clerical workers.”64  The mere fact that some work environments will exist 
where employer monitoring rights will be abused fails to justify additional 
statutory protections. 
¶27 Even if the employer happens across private information in her 
monitoring of an employee’s Internet use, several legal principles require 
that the information be handled with the respect it deserves.  The cause of 
action for public disclosure of private facts forbids the “unreasonable 
publicity of private information.”65  A cause of action under the doctrine of 
false light arises where “offensive publicity attributes to the plaintiff's 
characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false, such that the plaintiff is 
placed before the public in a false position.”66  Similarly, defamation 
prevents false elaboration upon the discrete facts obtained by the employer 
in the course of his surveillance.67  An action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress may also lie in those instances that are particularly 
outrageous.68  Additional causes of action may arise depending upon the 
circumstances or the particular nature of the information.69 
¶28 Consequently, despite those anecdotal cases where employers have 
abused their dominant position, most employers do not have an incentive to 
use electronic monitoring unfairly.  Employers will, in most cases, account 
for the personal lives of their employees, and numerous legal doctrines 
prevent the misuse of private information obtained by monitoring.  Despite 
these incentives, there will exist those work environments that are 
substandard to the point of being abusive; there will be those organizations 
where employees are limited in their ability to voice their disapproval by 
quitting because job opportunities are limited.  Nevertheless, these 
workplace environments are unlikely to be improved significantly by the 
creation of additional statutory protections for electronic privacy.  Excessive 
monitoring can take many controlling forms without the aid of computer 
surveillance if that is the intent of the employer.  Still, these instances are 
exceptions. 
                                                     
64 Atwell, supra note 59, at 96. 
65 Gabel and Mansfield, supra note 10, at 314. 
66 Id. at 315. 
67 See id. at 317—18. 
68 See id. at 318—19. 
69 For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act may govern the use of certain 
information.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq. (2000). 
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CONCLUSION 
¶29 Commentators have attacked the current state of employment 
privacy law as anachronistic, outmoded and unrealistic, given the new 
power that computer surveillance software has provided to employers.  
Other common law countries like the United Kingdom and Australia have 
responded to these criticisms and set out statutory schemes specifically 
governing monitoring of employee computer use.70  Additional statutory 
protection in the United States, however, is unnecessary. 
¶30 Undoubtedly, U.S. law affords employees little protection against 
employer monitoring of their Internet activities.  As a matter of judicial 
precedent, this allocation of rights is unlikely to change.  With time, as more 
and more employers realize the need to monitor the Internet activities of 
their employees and employment decisions are increasingly supported by 
computer monitoring, fewer employees will believe that their online 
conversations are confidential.71  Thus to some extent, the lack of judicial 
enthusiasm for the privacy of employee Internet activity will render it a 
public activity. 
¶31 This outcome, however, is entirely fair given the nature and purpose 
of the workplace and the substantial liability employers face for the actions 
of their employees.  Moreover, employers are unlikely to misuse their 
monitoring privilege as it is in their best interest to balance surveillance 
needs with employee quality of life, and because employer misuse of 
personal information is prohibited by a variety of existing legal doctrines.  
Fundamentally, the Internet has not changed the balance of power in the 
workplace.  Employees have a new and creative way to shirk their 
responsibilities, and employers have technological means by which they can 
mitigate these indiscretions.   
 
                                                     
70 See Muckle, supra note 5 (discussing UK law); Privacy Amendment (Private 
Sector) Act of 2000, supra note 5 (revising Australian privacy law). 
71 See, e.g.,  Andrew Bibby, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 
FREELANCER.DK, at 
http://www.freelancer.dk/default.asp?pageToLoad=visNyhed%2Easp%3Fartikel
ID%3D248 (last visited Apr. 23, 2004) (noting that a survey revealed that at 215 
UK companies, 65 employees had been terminated for inappropriate Internet 
use); Mulchandani, supra note 56 (discussing how an employee can protect 
herself against workplace monitoring). 
